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THE ORGANIZATIONAL PREMISES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
WILLIAM H. SIMON
I
INTRODUCTION
The core doctrines of administrative law have not taken account of
developments in the theory and practice of organization. The contours of these
doctrines were set in the mid-twentieth century when the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) was passed. Although these doctrines have evolved since
then, administration itself has changed more. Many of the widely perceived
deficiencies of the doctrines, including some associated with overregulation and
others with underregulation, seem influenced by an anachronistic
understanding of organization.
Much administrative law continues to understand public administration as
bureaucracy. In particular, doctrine is strongly influenced by three premises.
First, the backward-looking conception of legitimacy sees organization as
instrumental to previously chosen values and goals. Authority thus depends on
prior authorization. Second, there is the balance between fixed rules and
unreviewable discretion. In the bureaucratic view, the rule is the most important
type of norm. However, because rules are relatively inflexible and difficult to
change, residual pockets of unaccountable discretion must be tolerated. And,
third, is the reactive approach to error detection. Errors are understood to arise
from idiosyncratic circumstances; they are addressed primarily through
complaints, and complaints are understood to raise primarily issues of
individual accuracy or fairness.
The model of organization these premises express is associated in the
private sector with mass manufacturing of standardized products as it
developed in the early and mid-twentieth centuries. The ideas developed in
manufacturing influenced public administration, especially the Progressive and
New Deal regulatory and social welfare programs. The designers of the APA
were responding to these programs. This model was once the dominant
paradigm of efficient large-scale organization, but it now competes with, and in
some quarters has been displaced by, another one.
This newer,
postbureaucratic or performance-based approach has emerged in the private
Copyright © 2015 by William H. Simon.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
 Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University. Thanks for encouragement and advice
to Tino Cuellar, Jerry Mashaw, Gillian Metzger, Todd Rakoff, J.B. Ruhl, Charles Sabel, and Peter
Strauss.

SIMON_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE)

62

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

3/3/2015 12:56 AM

[Vol. 78:61

sector as industries have sought flexibility to adapt to more volatile economic
circumstances and to the demand for more differentiated products. As
reformers have recognized an analogous need for government to respond to
fluidity and diversity, they have imported elements of the postbureaucratic view
to the public sector.
In postbureaucratic organization, legitimacy depends less on prior
authorization than on transparency and consequent openness to ongoing diffuse
democratic pressures. The key type of norm is not the rule but the plan. Plans
are more comprehensive than rules, and although plans may contain rules, as
norms, they are more provisional and less categorically prescriptive than
bureaucratic rules. Plans typically set out procedures for monitoring their own
implementation and for frequent reassessment in light of information derived
from monitoring. Whereas change in bureaucracy tends to be episodic, change
in postbureaucratic organization tends to be continuous. Although they do not
regulate as tightly as rules, plans do not create pockets of unaccountable
discretion. Departures from a plan may be permissible, but they typically trigger
review and require explanation. Finally, postbureaucratic organization takes a
proactive approach to error detection: It tends to rely on audits more than
complaints, and it takes a diagnostic approach to complaints, understanding
them not just as evidence of idiosyncratic deviance, but as symptoms of systemic
malfunction.
Part II of this article argues that administrative law doctrine reflects the
older view of organization (1) in its often-obsessive preoccupation with
statutory authorization and its relative indifference to transparency; (2) in
treating rules and rulemaking as rigid constraints on administrative action in
some spheres while tolerating wide unreviewable discretion in others; and (3) in
understanding adjudication as a series of independent responses to idiosyncratic
errors. This orientation fits poorly with regulatory and welfare initiatives that
are premised on a different understanding of organization. In consequence,
efforts to achieve administrative accountability are often heavy-handed or
ineffectual or both.
The gravity of this charge depends on how we define “administrative law.”
As I have used it so far, the term denotes the text and judicial interpretations of
the APA and associated constitutional doctrine on delegation and procedural
due process. This doctrine is largely concerned with the role of the courts (1) in
policing administrative rulemaking and formal adjudication and (2) in enforcing
agency compliance with statutes and their own rules. The doctrine—which I call
“canonical” administrative law—occupies the largest and most prominent
positions in treatises and the casebooks. It coexists with other doctrines, but it is
more integrally and densely elaborated than the others, and it is the doctrine
academics find easiest to teach and test. This is the doctrine that part II argues
1
is out of touch with performance-based organization.
1. David Zaring refers to what I call canonical doctrine as “administrative law conventionally
understood.” He finds that it “misses a great swath of actual administration, in addition to what lawyers
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However, the canonical doctrine represents only a small and, in some
respects, arbitrary subset of the universe of law governing public administrative
practice. Noncanonical elements of this broader universe strongly reflect the
performance-based view. The anachronistic character of conventional doctrine
is partly a function of the way in which the canon has been defined.
Part III demonstrates the emergence of performance-based organization in
three bodies of doctrine that are typically ignored in accounts of administrative
law, even though they are centrally concerned with administration. The first is a
set of statutory directives concerned with administrative transparency, planning,
and proactive error detection. A second body of noncanonical administrative
law consists of initiatives through which the White House or agencies have used
discretion to move agency practice in a performance-based direction. Finally, a
third source of noncanonical authority has been developed by the courts in
institutional-reform litigation—civil rights actions seeking to restructure public
agencies or programs. As developed by the lower courts in recent decades, this
doctrine is predominantly influenced by postbureaucratic conceptions of
organization.
The interventions I characterize as performance-based span a range of
structures. Some are relatively hierarchical, focused on static efficiency, and
driven by individual choice or market mechanisms in a manner that has been
characterized as “minimalist.” Others are relatively decentralized, focused on
learning, and driven by deliberative mechanisms in a manner that has been
called “experimentalist.” However, all converge in their rejection of core
2
assumptions about organization made in canonical administrative law.
Part IV concludes that canonical administrative law suffers in two broad
respects from its inattention to performance-based organization. First,
descriptively, the canon gives an arbitrarily truncated picture of the role of law
in the administrative state. Second, normatively, its interventions are often
poorly designed for the central task on which it focuses—judicial control of
administrative action.
II
CANONICAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION
Canonical administrative law consists of the text and judicial elaboration of
the APA and the related constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and
do to affect it.” David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 236 (2010). My
argument supports this claim and suggests some of the reasons for the gap between doctrine and
practice.
2. See generally Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011). See also Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, ManagementBased Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC. REV. 691
(2003) (describing the supersession of command-and-control by regimes focused on output monitoring
in some fields and on customized planning in others). Although Coglianese and Lazer use the term
“performance-based” only in connection with output-monitoring, the term as used in this article
includes both approaches.

SIMON_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE)

64

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

3/3/2015 12:56 AM

[Vol. 78:61

procedural due process. Its most prominent concerns are the role of courts
when reviewing administrative action and the procedural requirements of
administrative rulemaking and adjudication. This authority can be demanding,
but measured in relation to the range of administrative activity, it is quite
narrow. It does not reach some of the most practically important official
conduct.
Some of the most dysfunctional features of canonical doctrine—both the
excessively burdensome ones and the excessively lax ones—are associated with
its highly limited and increasingly anachronistic conception of public
administration. This conception is reflected in the key themes of (1) the
backward-looking conception of legitimacy; (2) the need to choose between
fixed rules and unreviewable discretion; and (3) the reactive approach to error
detection.
A. The Backward-Looking Conception of Legitimacy
The canonical authority tends to assume that the legitimacy of
administrative action depends most fundamentally on prior authorization. In a
democracy, the people are sovereign, but their only standard form of
participation is voting in general elections. They choose representatives who
make decisions on their behalf by enacting statutes. Although legislation is one
step removed from the electoral decisions of the people, it carries the legitimacy
of electoral warrant. Administrative action, on the other hand, is more than one
step removed. As a result, its legitimacy depends on the ability to find some
warrant in the steps closer to the electoral process. Most often, the quest is for
some mandate in the decisions of the legislature. The President is an elected
official, too, and presidential authorization may sometimes be adequate or
necessary, but the dominant separation-of-powers conceptions most often make
legislative authorization critical. Either way, we are dealing with what Fritz
3
Scharpf calls “input legitimacy.”
The backward-looking conception can be contrasted to a view that sees
democratic legitimacy in terms of oversight. Legislators define goals and set a
framework for administration, but administrators are expected to pursue the
goals in ways that the legislators cannot foresee. Thus, in addition to
authorizing executive conduct in advance, the legislature also monitors and
responds to such conduct after the fact. It can respond through both revision of
authority and reallocation of resources. Similarly, electoral candidates take
positions based on retrospective evaluations of administrative performance, and
voters’ electoral choices take implicit positions on such evaluations.
Authorization gives administrative action input legitimacy, but when Congress
or the electorate approves administrative action retrospectively, it recognizes
“output” legitimacy. In the oversight perspective, the most central institutional
concern is transparency. Transparency tends both to improve the quality of

3. FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE OR DEMOCRATIC? 6–10 (1999).
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decisions and to facilitate accountability. It enables the legislature and the
electorate to reverse or restrict decisions of which they disapprove. And it
subjects administrators to the informal pressures of shame and pride that may
contribute further to the alignment of practice with legislative and popular will.
Canonical administrative law is heavily preoccupied with prior
authorization. It occasionally invokes oversight values, but, just as often, it is
indifferent to or disdainful of them. To begin, the nondelegation doctrine—the
usual starting point of treatises and courses on administrative law—purports to
constitutionalize the principle of prior authorization by requiring a threshold of
legislative specification. Because the courts have not been able to specify a
threshold that would impose any practical limit on contemporary legislative
activity, the doctrine has no direct effect as constitutional constraint, but it
looms over the field as both forlorn hope and noble aspiration.
At the same time that the nondelegation doctrine exalts prior authorization,
it rejects any role for values associated with oversight. For decades, commenters
suggested that deficiency in legislative specification might be mitigated by
4
administrative self-discipline through rulemaking. Specification at the agency
level would not amplify the connection to prior legislative acts, but it would
make current practice more transparent and hence more open to ongoing
appraisal. Yet, when an intermediate court pursued this suggestion, the
nondelegation proponents on the Supreme Court emphatically rebuffed it,
denying that nondelegation constraints entailed or could be satisfied by
5
postenactment specification. At the moment, the doctrine stands solely for
backward-looking accountability, but without imposing any practical constraints
that might further it.
These backward-looking concerns are evident in the textualist or formalist
approaches that urge narrow interpretation of statutes. A basic argument of
textualist or formalist proponents is that the farther judicial decisions depart
from statutory text, the less confident we can be that those decisions have been
authorized by the legislature. Courts must have authority to elaborate law, but
the argument asserts that some consequences—notably, those that depart from
traditional common law norms or that threaten constitutional protections—
should only be imposed by the legislature. Refusing to construe ambiguous
statutes to impose novel consequences is a way of protecting baseline common
law or constitutional values from casual or unreflective impingement. There is
wide disagreement over textualist methodology and over the domain in which it
6
should be applied, but it is influential.
4. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 1–25
(1971).
5. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (“The idea that an agency can cure
an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power
seems to us internally contradictory.”).
6. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 140–42 (1958) (applying strict construction to protect civil
liberties); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–45 (1983) (urging strict
statutory construction to protect common law values).

SIMON_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE)

66

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

3/3/2015 12:56 AM

[Vol. 78:61

When the courts take a limited view of their functions under canonical
administrative law, they frequently invoke backward-looking legitimacy. The
most capacious and frequently invoked provision of the APA section on “scope
of review” authorizes courts to set aside agency actions found to be “arbitrary,
7
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
Viewing the text alone, one might think that there are many ways that
administrative action could be unlawfully arbitrary, capricious, or abusive other
than by departing from legislative enactment. One might view the broad
language as, in part, a mandate for the courts to develop a common law of
administrative practice—or rather, to resume doing so, since prior to the APA,
a large fraction of administrative law consisted of judge-made subconstitutional
8
norms. Often, however, the courts limit their role to ensuring that
administrative action conforms to legislative authorization. Notably, in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the
Supreme Court rejected lower-court efforts to elaborate procedures that might
9
serve oversight values. The Court held that courts lack authority to require an
agency to receive and consider evidence in a rulemaking proceeding beyond the
10
duties mandated by the APA. More generally, the courts often decline to
11
review agency action where there is “no law to apply.” They say that where
rules are too incomplete or ambiguous to permit an assessment of authority,
12
there is nothing for them to do.
On the other hand, there is a common law–like counter-trend in canonical
administrative law, in which courts demand safeguards with little or no
13
attention to statutory mandate. This trend has an ambiguous relation to the
backward-looking view of legitimacy. When the courts follow this trend, they
require administrators to give consideration to specified interests and to
provide reasonable explanations of their decisions (and when the explanations
are not forthcoming, the courts intervene more directively). This requirement
can be quite demanding, as in the landmark case Motor Vehicles Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm, where the Court insisted that the agency demonstrate
that its decision took account of concerns and alternative proposals raised by
14
stakeholders. The demand for reasonable consideration and explanation could
be related to prior-authorization concerns. The explanation might assist the
Court in assessing the conformity of the action in question to the governing

7. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
8. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1671–76 (1975).
9. 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
10. Id. at 548.
11. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (stating that the
APA does not permit review where there is “no law to apply”).
12. See infra notes 37–58.
13. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293 (2012).
14. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983).
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legislation. However, the oversight rationale for the requirement seems at least
as strong. The explanation enables the legislature and the electorate to better
perceive and assess official practice.
Some specific statutory and regulatory provisions that are plainly motivated
by oversight values have been incorporated into the canon. The most important
15
are those in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). FOIA, however, seems
peripheral to the main concerns of the canonical doctrine. It is in the canon
mainly by virtue of the largely accidental fact that it was codified in the APA.
Although the reasonable-consideration-and-explanation doctrine and FOIA
are important, they are also quite limited from an ambitious oversight
perspective. The former applies most often in the narrow context of
rulemaking, and although it is not in principle restricted to that context, the
16
courts often decline to apply it in other contexts. FOIA applies only to
“records” that the administrator has chosen to create (or must create under
other law); it does not affirmatively require the creation of records. Other APA
provisions do require disclosure of basic information about the agency’s
17
organization, operations, and procedures. But nothing in the statute requires
the agency to generate and disclose information about, for example, the
activities of its frontline agents or the general efficacy its efforts.
B. The Dialectic of Rule and Discretion
Portrayals of bureaucracy emphasize hierarchy and coordination through
relatively inflexible rule. In this form of organization, decisions about goals and
decisions about implementation are strongly separated. Decisions about goals
are a matter of political choice. Decisions about implementation are technical
matters. The primary tool of implementation is the rule. Rules are understood
as both general (they apply across a range of situations) and narrow (they
regulate only a specific dimension of each situation). Although the totality of
rules for a given program within a bureaucracy reflects a coherent vision,
individual rules can be applied unreflectively without reference to the larger
understanding that unites them. Rules transmit upper-level decisions more or
less mechanically.
Most accounts imply that rules are relatively stable over time. Stability is
implied in the strong separation between conception (rulemaking), which
occurs at the top, and execution (implementation), which ultimately occurs at
the frontline. The distance between rulemakers and implementers suggests that
it may take time for information about the effects of the rules to travel from the
frontline to the top and for new rules to be effectively communicated from the
top to the frontline.
Rule-enforced hierarchy is valued in the private sector for efficiency. It
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2012) (requiring certain agency meetings to be
open to the public).
16. See cases cited infra notes 37–58.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(1).
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minimizes dependence on the scarce capacity for complex judgment and the
time consumed in coordinating activity. It is valued in the public sphere on
democratic as well as efficiency grounds. The democracy point is that rule-based
organization most effectively links administrative conduct to the decisions of
elected officials, and hence, to the electorate. The understanding of public
administration as presumptively rule-based was highly influential in the United
States from the beginning of the twentieth century through the New Deal
18
period.
However, most versions of this understanding accord some room in rulebased organization for informal discretionary judgment. The view of
government as a balance of rules and discretion was classically formulated by
John Locke. His Second Treatise of Government emphasized the importance of
19
checking arbitrary official power by subjecting it to “stated rules.” However, it
recognized that unforeseen situations will arise where either the legislature has
“given no direction” or “strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm.”
In response, there must be a realm of “prerogative,” which Locke defines as
20
“nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule.”
Many modern views have qualified this notion with the hope that expertise
can discipline informal judgment. But, to varying degrees, proponents of these
views have tended to consider expert judgment to be inarticulate or ineffable
and hence capable of only limited explanation and review. Progressive and New
Deal theorists argued for a strong role for non-rule-governed expertise at the
administrative summit and, in some cases, like child welfare, at the frontline.
They thought of such judgment as structured but only in ways that were not
21
readily demonstrable.
After World War II, a further set of qualifications to the rule-governed
character of public administration was increasingly accepted. Portrayals of
“street-level bureaucracy” emphasized that rule departure by frontline officials

18. See generally FRANK GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN
GOVERNMENT (1900); LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: OLD AND NEW 79–101
(2006). On the classical view more generally, see FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956–58, 973–74 (Guenther
Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
19. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 405 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960).
20. Id. at 421, 425. The possible role of informal judgment enters Max Weber’s formulation in the
guise of the “England problem”—the question of how England was able to develop economically
without the degree of rule-based administration that Weber thought important to successful capitalism.
David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 720, 746–47 (1972).
21. E.g., James M. Landis, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 148–51 (1938). Charles Reich
caricatured the Progressive and New Deal proponents of the administrative state. He stated that the
proponents believed in a “new kind of decision” as to which “checks and balances and other restraints .
. . would not be relevant . . . .” Quoting John Griffiths, he continued: The ‘administrative’ decision was
conceived of as that right decision which will be clear to an ‘expert’ if, without the help (they would
have said, the hindrance) of criteria, standards, rules, etc., he confronts a vast array of raw data.”
Charles A. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L. J. 1227, 1235 (1966) (quoting John
Griffiths). See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (1977) (describing frontline discretion).
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was pervasive and routine. Some departures were malign, resulting from the
pursuit of deviant goals by the officials, but some amount of malign
noncompliance was inevitable or even optimal, because it could be eliminated
only at intolerable cost. Other departures were benign. They took the form of
street-level judgments of the sort Locke’s “prerogative” idea contemplated for
top-level officials—judgments designed to mitigate the surface inflexibility of
the rules in order to vindicate their underlying purposes. Two routes for
improvement suggested themselves. Analysts could try to identify those areas in
which rules could be tightened to eliminate street-level discretion without
incurring excessive costs. Alternatively, the state might seek to influence the
exercise of discretion in a more benign direction through recruitment or
22
socialization of frontline officials.
This bureaucratic view of administration as a matter of hierarchically
imposed rules supplemented by unaccountable discretion should be compared
to a newer understanding of organization that de-emphasizes hierarchy and
seeks adaptability to context and changing circumstances at all organizational
levels. The postbureaucratic understanding of organization rejects any strong
distinction between decisions about goals and decisions about implementation.
It views implementation, not only or even primarily as compliance with
previously enacted norms, but also as a course of discovery and elaboration. If
change in bureaucracy is episodic, in postbureaucratic organization, it is
continuous.
In the postbureaucratic view, the paradigmatic norm is not the rule, but the
plan. A plan is more comprehensive than a rule. It provides a general
framework for a program. The plan contains specific norms, but they do not
stand apart from the plan. It is expected that the norms will be applied in light
of the plan at all levels. Plans may contain rules, but their most characteristic
norms lack the categorical quality that the bureaucratic view attributes to the
rule. A rule either applies or does not, and when it applies, it demands
conformity. By contrast, plan norms are often presumptive; agents may be
authorized to depart from the prescription when compliance would not serve
the purposes set forth in the plan. Typically, however, they must signal and
explain their departures in a way that triggers both administrative review of
23
their conduct and reassessment of the rule. Plans may also contain indicators,
22. JERRY M. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 145–71 (1983). Influential works on street-level bureaucracy include MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (1980); JAMES
Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968). An important earlier demonstration of the need
for informal judgment in the private sector is ALVIN GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL
BUREAUCRACY (1964).
23. For example:
If the individual actually performing the activity cannot or believes he should not follow the
procedure governing that activity as written, he shall place the system/component into a stable
and safe condition and inform the responsible supervisor. Situations such as this could occur if
the procedure is found to be inadequate for the intended task, if unexpected results occur, or
if two more procedures governing the activity conflict. The supervisor shall resolve the
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which are intended to measure changes in performance over time or in relation
to comparable institutions.
In addition, plans are provisional. A good plan provides for frequent or
continuous reassessment of practices and goals. It provides for monitoring of
the effects of practice in achieving its goals. The bureaucratic view sees
monitoring as a way to ensure compliance with promulgated norms. The newer
view sees monitoring, in addition, as a process of reassessing the efficacy of the
24
practices these norms dictate.
Both views of organization prescribe that the practices of the organization’s
agents conform to the organization’s articulated norms, but for different
reasons. The primary role of articulated norms in bureaucratic organization is
to restrict discretion. Their primary role in postbureaucratic organization is
transparency. When practice conforms to norms, an observer can read off what
is happening from the norms. This facilitates reassessment and change by
enabling agents in different positions in the organization to better perceive what
practices are producing the results they observe. Hewing to articulated norms
also facilitates public oversight and accountability.
Canonical administrative law reflects the influence of the bureaucratic view
of organization in two ways: (1) in its preoccupation with the enactment or
initiation of administrative measures and its relative indifference to their
application or implementation, and (2) in its tendency to divide administration
into realms of heavily regulated practice and realms of unaccountable

discrepancy in the procedure by either [determining that the procedure is in fact adequate or]
submitting a procedure change.
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION, GOOD PRACTICE—CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
(July 1984) 18–19 (quoted in JOSEPH REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE EVOLUTION OF
NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 82 (1996); see generally William H. Simon, Toyota
Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE E.U.
AND THE U.S. (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
24. A convenient if crude distillation of the postbureaucratic view can be found in a slogan called
the “Demming cycle.” It prescribes as a paradigm for conduct at all levels of the organization: “Plan,
Do, Study, Act.” “Plan” entails a statement of general goals, means to achieve them, and indicators to
evaluate progress in attaining goals. “Do” entails execution of the plan and connotes practice tightly
configured to plan. “Study” entails examination, documentation, and analysis of experienced
consequences in relation to anticipated ones and reassessment of the plan in the light of this experience.
“Act” involves revision of the plan. The cycle operates continuously, and the activities occur at all
levels of the organization. See GERALD J. LANGLEY ET AL., THE IMPROVEMENT GUIDE: A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO IMPROVING ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 23–24, 97–104, 442–43,
454 (2009); JEFFREY LIKER, THE TOYOTA WAY: 14 MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES FROM THE WORLD’S
GREATEST MANUFACTURER 263–65 (2004). For two especially influential accounts of postbureaucracy in the private sector, see PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND
PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1994) and JAMES P. WOMACK & DANIEL T. JONES,
LEAN THINKING: BANISH WASTE AND CREATE WEALTH IN YOUR CORPORATION (1996). For public
sector applications, see DONALD KETTL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA 33–150 (2002); Lynn, supra note 18, at
104–82; MARK H. MOORE, RECOGNIZING PUBLIC VALUE (2013). The convergence of public and
private sectors is analyzed in Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in Routines, in THE FIRM AS A
COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 106–56
(Charles Hecksher & Paul Adler eds., 2006).
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discretion.
Strikingly, rulemaking is the only form of administrative—as opposed to
25
adjudicatory—conduct extensively addressed in the APA. Edward Rubin has
emphasized that the statute virtually defines other forms of administration out
of existence by characterizing all forms of agency “disposition” other than
rulemaking as “adjudication” (and by then leaving largely unregulated all forms
26
of adjudication not involving hearings). An equally eccentric definition occurs
in Executive Order 12,866, where “regulatory action” is said to mean action that
27
“promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation [of a] rule.” This
order mandates cost-benefit analysis and preannouncement White House
review of regulations. It is the one executive initiative to achieve prominence in
the canon (as measured by the attention to it in casebooks). It is innovative in
some respects, but it is entirely conventional in its conflation of administration
with the promulgation of rules.
For this specialized category of “regulatory action,” the APA imposes
procedures that are potentially quite demanding. The statute prescribes a
“notice-and-comment” process whereby rules are announced; citizens are given
a period in which to submit comments, and the regulator must consider and
28
respond to the comments. Applying “hard look” judicial review, courts have
made demands for explanation and response to comments that create
substantial risks of reversal for controversial rules. This process has been
extended by the White House review required by Executive Order 12,866 and
by a further stage in which Congress reviews and can abrogate the rule prior to
29
effectiveness (though it rarely does so).
The canonical administrative law regime provides a good deal of
transparency and opportunity for public discussion. On the other hand, many
believe that it goes too far, entailing pointless expense and permitting
25. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6)–(7) (2012).
26. Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89
CORNELL L. REV.95, 110–12, 123–31 (2003). Rubin continues, “[the APA provides] no foothold, no
conceptual framework, for imposing requirements on most actions that [lie] beyond the ambit of rulemaking and formal adjudication.” Id. at 126. I have relied heavily on Rubin’s critique of the limits of
canonical doctrine, but his overall argument ignores the distinction between bureaucratic and
performance-based organization that is central to the argument here. See also Alan B. Morrison,
Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN.
L. REV. 79, 98 (2007) (emphasizing that canonical doctrine is primarily about rulemaking and
adjudication). The constrained vocabulary of canonical doctrine accounts for the fact that many agency
decisions that resolve policy issues affecting large numbers of people are referred to in the canon as
“adjudications.” Proceedings on such matters as the licensing of power plants, the allocation of
broadcast spectrum, or the authorization of bank mergers are often styled as adjudicatory. When this
happens, the procedures are different, though typically no less elaborate than rulemaking. Like
rulemaking, these procedures reflect a tendency to focus on initiation of policy as opposed to
implementation.
27. Exec. Order No. 12866, § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2012).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
29. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 213–34, 665–66 (2011).
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30

opportunistic delay by private parties. The rule focus of canonical doctrine
continues even after rules become effective. Courts require agencies to comply
with rules in a broad range of situations, including when the agencies seek
coercive enforcement against private parties and when they respond to requests
for individual welfare benefits. Rules, once enacted, are often hard to change,
since change normally requires going back to the rulemaking procedure.
However, the intensely controlled realm of rulemaking and rule compliance
coexists with a more extensive realm of relatively uncontrolled discretion. If the
doctrine is strict in some areas, it is strikingly permissive in others. To begin
with, some important areas of government activity are exempted from
rulemaking and other canonical safeguards. Notably, the administrative law of
national security is full of “grey holes” and “black holes” that make it a weak
mechanism of democratic accountability. The courts tend to dismiss challenges
to practices that implicate national security on the grounds that they originate
in the White House, which is not an “agency” subject to the APA; that they are
within the statutory rulemaking exemption for matters involving a “military or
foreign affairs function”; that they involve nonreviewable “generalized
conduct” rather than reviewable “agency action”; or that they are “committed
to agency discretion by law.” Even where the courts reach the merits, they tend
31
to apply a deferential “soft look” standard.
More generally, although an agency is subject to extensive controls once it
decides to make rules in an area where exceptions do not apply, it retains in
many areas virtually unreviewable discretion as to whether to make rules at all.
Rulemaking procedures apply to “legislative rules”—rules that represent the
exercise of legislatively conferred discretion. What rules qualify for this
designation is substantially a function of how the agency chooses to characterize
the rule. Some organic statutes require rulemaking, but some do not. Even
those that do require rulemaking leave the agency broad discretion as to a given
rule’s level of specificity.
As far as the APA is concerned, an agency is typically free to operate on the
basis of interpretive rules and nonbinding “guidance” norms that do not require
32
notice-and-comment. Indeed, it is often free to dispense even with nonbinding

30. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Questions of Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 391–92 (1986) (suggesting that strict review of rulemaking makes the agency more reluctant
“to change the status quo”); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 158–80 (1997) (explaining how judicial review of rulemaking
creates opportunities for strategic delay); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Improving
Regulation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004) (arguing that the
regulatory process tends to be excessively focused on the “front end” and insufficiently capable of
ongoing adjustment).
31. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1106–31
(2009).
32. See, e.g., Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 1035–36 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d
73, 79–83 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
859, 876–81 (2009); Peter Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L. J. 1463, 1466–68, 1472–73,
1480–81 (1992).
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33

norms and leave matters to ungoverned frontline discretion. Agencies also
have broad freedom to announce new norms through adjudication, rather than
34
through rulemaking. True, an agency generally gets some benefits from
enacting legislative rules. In principle, legislative rules qualify for Chevron
deference, and they satisfy the notice requirements for coercive enforcement
35
(though so can nonlegislative rules). However, as we have noted, rulemaking
often entails large costs. Canonical administrative law leaves the agency with
36
extensive freedom as to how to balance benefits and costs.
Where administrative action does not take the form of rulemaking or
adjudication, judicial review is often minimal. In principle, review is not limited
to rulemaking and adjudication. There is even a presumption of reviewability
37
for all agency action, but the presumption is easily rebutted for much activity.
As Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has said, “[R]eview remains either unavailable
or fairly cursory for a massive range of discretionary decisions involving
national security, foreign policy, immigration, domestic regulatory enforcement,
38
public benefits, and investigation or prosecution.”
There is a general reluctance to review when the agency’s alleged failure is
passive rather than active. Notwithstanding the APA language that makes
“failure to act” reviewable and that authorizes courts to “compel agency action
39
unlawfully withheld,” courts treat many forms of agency inaction as
nonreviewable. In refusing to consider whether the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) had abused its discretion in failing to regulate drugs
used in capital punishment, the Supreme Court explained, “When an agency
refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power over an
individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas
40
that courts often are called upon to protect.” And an agency’s failure to
exercise its authority to enforce enacted law is generally a matter of
41
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion.
33. See, e.g., Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 348 (7th
Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta that subordinate official’s refusal to certify an applicant for tribal status not
reviewable where the “executive branch has not sought to canalize the discretion of its subordinate
officials by means of regulations”).
34. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 291 n.21, 294 (1974).
35. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
36. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Methods of Administrative
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 157, 165–70 (2000) (suggesting that increasing formality of the
rulemaking process has induced greater resort to informal modes of regulation). In a study of the
Department of the Treasury, David Zaring shows that canonical doctrine has little influence there
because many activities are covered by statutory exemptions, and with respect to others, the
department is able to avoid rulemaking and formal adjudication. See supra note 1.
37. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), overruled on other grounds
by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
38. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 229
n.2 (2006).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).
40. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
41. Ellison v. Connor, 153 F.3d 247, 251 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding Corps of Engineers decisions
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As the doctrine plays out, it tends to minimize review of precisely those
practices that the postbureaucratic view of organization regards as central—
planning, monitoring, and reassessment.
1. Planning
Two revealing cases on planning arose under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
an environmental group charged that the Secretary of the Interior was making
decisions about the use of federal lands in an ad hoc manner that was both
42
arbitrary and excessively deferential to mining interests. It sought, inter alia,
specific enforcement of the statutory mandate that the administrators “develop,
maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts
43
or areas for the use of the public lands.” The Court held the claim not to be an
“agency action” or “failure to act” reviewable under the APA:
The [plaintiff’s claim] does not refer to a single [Bureau of Land Management (BLM)]
order or regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular BLM orders and
regulations. [Rather, it challenges] the continuing (and thus constantly changing)
operations of the BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation applications and the
classifications of public lands and developing land use plans as required by the
44
FLPMA.

Apparently worried that the claim would require courts to undertake
comprehensive administrative direction, the Court insisted that the APA did
not authorize “wholesale correction” of agency noncompliance but only
45
challenges of “manageable proportions.”
The Court, per Justice Scalia, gave a textualist gloss to the point in Norton v.
46
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. This time, plaintiffs sought to compel the
agency to implement a plan it had adopted under the FLPMA, requiring
47
curtailment of off-road vehicle use on various federal lands. Justice Scalia
pointed out that the examples of reviewable “agency action” mentioned in the
APA—“rule, order, license, sanction . . . relief”—all involved “circumscribed,
discrete” actions and, applying the ejusdem generis canon, concluded that a
48
broad failure to plan did not qualify. He suggested that this interpretation was
reinforced by the concern that judicial enforcement of such broad norms would
49
involve inappropriate judicial intrusion into “day-to-day” agency management.
regarding applications to use Corps property unreviewable); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
728 F.2d 518, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding agency’s refusal to intervene to halt bank marketing
practice unreviewable); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (holding
compliance with statute requiring that military supplies be shipped on U.S. vessels when available
“committed to agency discretion” by law).
42. 497 U.S. 871, 879 (1990).
43. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982)).
44. Id. at 890.
45. Id. at 873.
46. 542 U.S. 55, 67 (2004).
47. Id. at 60.
48. Id. at 62–65.
49. Id. at 67. The Sixth Circuit followed Norton in Am. Civil Liberty Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency,

SIMON_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE)

Nos. 1 & 2 2015]

3/3/2015 12:56 AM

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PREMISES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

75

2. Monitoring
That the agency has unreviewable discretion with respect to enforcement
decisions does not necessarily imply that the agency has such discretion with
respect to decisions to monitor the conduct of those it regulates or of its own
frontline agents. An agency that monitors effectively would have information
that would tend to make its enforcement decisions more reliable and hence
more worthy of deference.
Nevertheless, the courts tend to treat monitoring decisions as unreviewable.
For example, the Sixth Circuit refused to entertain a suit protesting the failure
of the Department and Health and Human Services (HHS) to collect data on
the racial incidence of services provided by federally supported health care
50
facilities. The plaintiffs argued that the failure made it impossible for the
government to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions of Title VI of the Civil
51
Rights Act. The court rejected the argument that monitoring decisions should
be distinguished from unreviewable prosecutorial ones: “The mechanism by
and extent to which HHS ‘monitors’ as well as ‘enforces’ compliance fall
52
squarely within the agency’s exercise of discretion.”
Canonical doctrine also holds that decisions of frontline personnel are not
reviewable “agency action” under the APA unless the agency has chosen to
53
review them, thus implying that there is no duty to review. The same premise
surfaces in the suggestion that it is a matter of agency discretion whether to
“canalize the discretion of its subordinate officers” through rules, rather than
54
leaving them to relatively ungoverned ad hoc decisions.

493 F.3d 644, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,128 S.Ct. 1334 (2008) (holding that National Security
Agency practices of warrantless electronic surveillance are “generalized conduct” and therefore not
“agency action” challengeable under the APA).
50. Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1129–31 (6th Cir. 1996).
51. Id. at 1123.
52. Id. at 1125 (quoting Gillis v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 573 (6th
Cir. 1985)). See also Sprint Comm’ns v. FCC, 76 F.3d 1221, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding FCC refusal
to investigate particular matter not reviewable); Am. Disabled for Attendant Programs Today v. U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 170 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 1991) (refusing to review HUD decisions
regarding investigation of possible violations of rules on subsidized housing discrimination against
handicapped).
53. Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 644–45 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding SEC “no-action” letter by
lower-tier staff not reviewable because an “agency’s decision to refrain from an investigation or an
enforcement action is generally unreviewable,” but stating that review might be available where, as in
an earlier case “the Commission examined the staff’s no-action determination and accepted it.”).
54. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 255 F.3d 342, 348 (7th Cir. 2001).
Whether there is a general duty, constitutional or otherwise, to discipline lower-tier discretion through
rules or guidance is, in fact, a mystery. Certainly there is no clear duty. The duty is sometimes denied.
See, e.g., Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 448 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Other cases have ordered the
promulgation of rules or guidance, though both the scope of the duty and its source (whether based on
the relevant organic statute, the constitution, or the APA) are typically ambiguous. See, e.g., Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Peter
Strauss et al, supra note 29, at 821–26.
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3. Reassessment
An agency has only weakly enforceable duties to reconsider its norms once
promulgated. Although courts often take a “hard look” at legislative rules at
the point of promulgation, they review decisions to leave promulgated rules in
place softly. Where the agency volunteers a legal reason for inaction, the courts
may review it, and where the agency itself initiates a proceeding to reconsider a
rule, the courts may demand a reasoned explanation of the agency’s failure to
55
follow through. But where the agency stands tacitly inert, intervention is
56
unlikely.
A recent Ninth Circuit case illustrates the influence of bureaucratic
57
conceptions of organization on claims based on failure to reassess. The Federal
Central Valley Project, the largest water-management system in the country,
operates under federal statutes that incorporate state standards designed to
protect wildlife habitat. One such standard is the “Vernalis salinity standard”
that imposes a limit on salinity as measured at a particular point in the system.
The Project proposed to satisfy this standard by regulating certain flows under
the “New Melones Interim Operations Plan.” The plan, which had been
adopted seven years earlier, “was initially intended to be temporary, but, for
lack of a better program, the Bureau [of Reclamation had] continued to operate
the CVP under [it] since its adoption.” Projections in the plan indicated that the
salinity standard would be exceeded in about one month out of ten. The
plaintiffs argued that such a pattern would not satisfy the statute and sought
relief compelling the agency to revise the plan. The court dismissed on the
ground that the plaintiffs had not shown sufficient likelihood of harm: Their
mistake, according to the court, was to assume “the Bureau’s continuous and
unswerving adherence to the Plan,” whereas the Bureau regarded the plan
merely as a “starting point” from which it would readily depart if necessary to
satisfy the salinity standard. Accepting the Bureau’s position, the court quoted
58
Dwight Eisenhower: “Plans are nothing; planning is everything.”
The quoted language is a central maxim of the postbureaucratic view of
organization, but the court misses the point. “Plans are nothing” means that one
must be prepared to depart from the plan in response to unforeseen
contingencies; it does not mean that an adequate plan can ignore foreseen
contingencies. Before the contingency arises, it is the second part of the maxim
that governs. If “planning is everything,” then the agency should be struggling
to provide as articulately and coherently as it can for key risks, and a court with
responsibility for enforcing the statute should assess these efforts. The agency is
not making adequate effort when it offers only a seven-year-old “interim”

55. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007); Am. Horse Protection Ass’n v. Lyng, 812
F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Where an agency does reassess, its decisions will often be immune to review
if they do not involve revision or abrogation of a rule. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
56. WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
57. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. Bureau of Reclamation, 452 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2006).
58. Id. at 1025–27.
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59

document that fails to address major known risks.
Although this decision turns on the requirement of irreparable harm for
injunctive relief, it is consistent with suggestions in other cases that provisional
agency norms and nonbinding guidelines do not qualify as reviewable “final
60
rules.” Such holdings seem to assume a world in which the key drivers of
public programs—and hence the proper focus of judicial accountability
efforts—are inflexible, hard-to-change rules that address relatively stable, wellunderstood problems.
4. Judicial Intervention: Compliance Versus Reasonable Consideration-andExplanation
As noted earlier, the prior-authorization and oversight conceptions of
legitimacy are associated with different forms of judicial intervention. The
prior-authorization view is associated with narrowly prescriptive orders
requiring compliance with enacted rules. The oversight view is associated with
demands for reasoned consideration and explanation. Both modes of
intervention appear in the canonical doctrine, but there seems to be a bias in
favor of the former.
The courts’ notion of justiciability seems constrained by the bureaucratic
view of organization. Courts are most willing to intervene in connection with
rules, which they tend to understand either as norms of the type governed by
APA rulemaking or more generally as discrete and inflexible norms, whether
promulgated by the legislature or by the agency itself. But when the courts
encounter more general and provisional norms, they have a harder time
conceiving of a role to play. As a result, in such situations, they often deny
review, saying that there is “no law to apply,” or that they cannot risk disrupting
coherent administrative practices, or that they should not usurp legislatively
conferred discretion. These rationales tend to assume that intervention would
take a compliance-type form. They often do not make sense with reference to
reasonable-consideration-and-explanation intervention.
A judicial demand for reasonable consideration and explanation need not
be based on determinate substantive rules. As illustrated by State Farm, the
courts can, without specific guidance from the organic statute, still ascertain that
the administrator has exercised discretion on the basis of generally appropriate
59. Although, in principle, performance-based organization calls for rigor and precision, in
practice its rhetoric of adaptation is often used to excuse laxness and vagueness. For example, J.B. Ruhl
and Robert Fischman observe that in environmental protection “adaptive management” often
degenerates into “‘on-the-fly’ management that promises some loosely described response to whatever
circumstances arise.” J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 424, 441 (2010). See also Alejandro Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 316–48 (2007) (describing design and implementation
failures in the Department of the Interior’s Habitat Conservation Program under the Endangered
Species Act).
60. E.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wildlife Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 69–71 (2004) (suggesting that the
provisionality of the land use plans in issue might make them not “final” agency action and hence
unreviewable under the APA).
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public norms, that she has considered the legitimate interests and arguments of
stakeholders, and that she has sufficiently developed and considered relevant
evidence. Far from disrupting coherent administration, mandating reasonable
consideration and explanation encourages the administrator to understand her
decision as integral to a general plan. And to the extent explanation makes
agency practice more transparent, it enhances legislative accountability.
The bias against reasonable-consideration-and-explanation intervention is
evident in the Court’s refusal to enforce the statutory land use planning
requirement in Lujan on the ground that “respondent cannot seek wholesale
improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the
Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are
61
normally made.” From outside the premises of the canon, this assertion seems
to miss the point. The plaintiff purported to be enforcing the statute as enacted,
not seeking revision. The “improvement” the plaintiff was seeking—reflection
on and coherent articulation of general policy—would have facilitated
legislative oversight and reconsideration, not preempted it. It would, of course,
have required the Court to assess the adequacy of the plan. However, such
assessment could have been made in terms of process norms if the statute
provided no substantive guidance.
True, requiring reasonable consideration and explanation is not costless. It
takes time and effort to produce explanations, and the courts will sometimes
mistakenly decide that explanation has been inadequate and will thereby
impose costs by inappropriately delaying administrative initiatives. But there is
no reason to think such costs lower with compliance-oriented review. In many
situations, specific enforcement of discrete rules is more disruptive and invasive
than broader oversight-type intervention.
Forest Guardians v. Babbitt illustrates this point. Congress provided in the
Endangered Species Act that the Secretary of the Interior must, within a year of
designating a species as endangered, publish a rule specifying habitat critical to
62
its survival. However, the Secretary concluded that Congress did not
appropriate sufficient funds to enable the Department to accomplish the task
within the statutory deadline. In a rule designating the Rio Grande silvery
minnow as endangered, the Secretary explained that the department was unable
to meet the habitat deadline for this and other species. The Secretary then
published a tiered schedule for working through its rulemaking backlog,
ranking various projects in order of urgency. When environmentalists sued to
force the Secretary to comply with the deadline for the silvery minnow, the
court held that resource constraints could not justify a refusal to comply with
“mandatory, nondiscretionary duties” imposed by statute and instructed the
lower court to order the Secretary to promulgate a rule designating habitat for
63
the silvery minnow “as soon as possible.”
61. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2012).
63. Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999).
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If the court had taken a reasonable-consideration-and-explanation view, it
probably would have denied relief. The administrator’s judgment about how to
allocate scarce resources (a category of judgment which courts sometimes single
64
out as entitled to exceptional deference ) was supported by a plan and by a
reasoned, good-faith explanation that the plaintiffs did not challenge. The court
could have interpreted the statutory command as implicitly qualified by the
availability of sufficient resources, but the court instead read it in a textualist
manner as a categorical injunction and ordered more or less strict compliance
with it. Although the planning order sought in Lujan would not necessarily have
interfered with the Secretary’s ability to organize implementation coherently,
this discrete compliance order had a high likelihood of doing so. Under the
court’s approach, the Secretary could be forced to obey a series of piecemeal
instructions that do not reflect anyone’s judgment about the proper allocation
of scarce public resources, but simply the distribution of private litigation
resources and the accidents of litigation timing.
5. Conclusion
The tortuous contours of reviewability doctrine reflect the presuppositions
of the bureaucratic view of organization. Control is intense with respect to the
form of administration this view treats as central—the rule—and relatively lax
with respect to the forms emphasized by the postbureaucratic view—plans,
monitoring, and reassessment. At the same time, the courts often assume a
fairly rigid dichotomy between rule-based organization and unaccountable
discretion. Where rule-based enforcement is not plausible, the courts often
ignore the possibility of reasonable consideration-and-explanation
accountability.
The doctrine seems dysfunctional. Rulemaking is overregulated, and rules
are overenforced, whereas non-rule-governed activities are likely to be
underregulated. The resulting incentives are perverse. Agencies that seek to
make themselves accountable through rulemaking face high costs that they
could avoid by resort to less transparent forms of administration. And courts
are encouraged to focus their accountability-inducing efforts on the agencies
that take the most initiative to make themselves accountable. But the need for
intervention is likely to be less with such agencies than with those who do not
make such efforts.
C. The Reactive Approach to Error Detection
The conventional understanding of bureaucracy assumes that administrative
supervision eliminates most errors. But even with optimal enforcement,
problems may remain because of an irreducible amount of random rule
departures or because of idiosyncratic circumstances that do not fit the
assumptions of the rule. These cases can be addressed through a backstop
process. The backstop officials may operate under more flexible norms that
64. E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
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permit more individualized consideration than line administration. Greater
discretion can be seen as a form of Lockean “prerogative” that mitigates the
harshness of rules in unforeseen circumstances. Modern commenters also
defend discretion to consider context as an expression of respect for the dignity
65
of citizens affected by a rule.
Consistency of decision across cases is not a central value in this perspective.
The goal is either to fit the norms to idiosyncratic circumstances or to afford
some subjective satisfaction to the individual claimant. Thus, the success of each
resolution can be measured independently of its relation to decisions in other
disputes or in line administration. In the private sector, the dispute-resolution
task may be conferred on a specialized complaint department with authority to
depart from the rules that govern line administrators. In the public sector, the
task will be given to judges or administrative roles modeled on judges
substantially independent of administrative supervision.
An objection to the focus on case-by-case fairness is that it slights the value
66
of horizontal equity—that is, treating like cases alike. Proponents of
postbureaucratic organization have a further concern: Case-by-case resolution
impairs transparency. Observers cannot infer decisions in disputed cases from
the relevant norms. Even if the records of disputes are public, the overall
quality and tenor of decisions can be assessed only by digesting the full records
of large amounts of cases. Postbureaucratic organization tries to achieve
transparency by hewing conduct to articulated norms. Transparency enhances
67
68
accountability.
In addition, it facilitates redesign.
Postbureaucratic
organization often deals with problems in which knowledge and circumstances
are varied and volatile. In these situations, it often does not make sense to see
errors as arising from idiosyncrasy. It is at least as likely that errors arise from
the suboptimal design of the system. In that case, errors contain diagnostic
information potentially relevant to systemic improvement. This information is
lost in low-visibility, case-by-case problem solving. Thus, postbureaucratic
industrial engineering forbids ad hoc, low-visibility responses to production
glitches of the sort often found in accounts of both Taylorist production and
69
street-level bureaucracy. The paradigmatic response in postbureaucratic

65. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
28 (1976).
66. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1997–98, 2007–10 (2012).
67. THE ISO 14000 HANDBOOK 196 (Joseph Casio ed., 1996).
68. Productivity Press Development Team, STANDARDIZED WORK FOR THE OPERATOR 12
(2002) (“Only when you have standardization can you systematically improve your operations without
creating chaos, and thereby gain adherence throughout your system when a better way is discovered.”).
69. An example from industrial production is the arrival of an auto fender at a paint station with a
small patch of dirt. The traditional response is either to paint over it and leave it for an end-of-the-line
rework department or to improvise some intervention to clean it off with whatever materials are at
hand. See John Paul MacDuffie, The Road to Root Cause: Shop-Floor Problem-Solving at Three Auto
Assembly Plants, 43 MGMT. SCI. 497, 500–01 (1997).
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organization is to “stop the line” in order to trigger a deliberation on the
appropriate systemic reform to deal with the larger dysfunction symptomized by
the glitch. Errors are treated diagnostically. If the enacted rules seem
inadequate to address the problem, then the response is to rewrite the rules
immediately. That way, practice continues to be readable from the rules.
Industrial production lends itself to a higher degree of normative
specification than activities that require contextualized judgment, such as
industrial risk assessment or social service design. However, postbureaucratic
organization has found ways to achieve a measure of norm-governed
transparency in sectors that depend on such judgment as well. The key is peer
70
deliberation and review. By discussing how the norms apply to particular
cases, peers develop consistent understanding, or “inter-rater reliability.” When
the discussions incorporate people from other disciplines and institutions, they
extend the range of reliable understanding.
Error detection in postbureaucratic organization is proactive in both a weak
and a strong sense. In the weak sense, it uses audit-type procedures that induce
reviews, rather than relying solely on complaints. If problems are learning
opportunities rather than manifestations of irreducible idiosyncrasy, then there
is good reason to seek them out. Such error-detection processes might involve
merely superficial examinations of compliance with simple norms—“checklist”
reviews. However, more ambitious efforts combine close examination of
particular cases with systemic reassessment. Examples include the types of
incident reporting associated with high-reliability industries like nuclear power
or aviation or the mortality-morbidity reviews that examine unexpected bad
71
outcomes in hospitals.
The reactive view of error detection dominates canonical administrative law.
The only form of error detection that figures in the canon is the adjudicatory
hearing regulated in the APA and required in many situations by constitutional
doctrine and organic statutes. The key convergent mandates of the APA and
the Constitution are participation by the claimant and independence of the

Here is a public-sector example from a nursing home inspection:
We observed a Chicago sanitarian point out during an exit conference following an inspection
that it is against the regulations to have a male and female in adjoining rooms sharing the
same toilet. The sanitarian concedes that in this particular case neither resident is capable of
using the toilet and that moving either of them would be upsetting to them. He says that he is
going to turn a blind eye to the rule for the sake of the residents, but he warns management
that someone else from the department could come along and cite them for this.
John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules Versus Standards in Nursing
Home Regulation, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 307, 329 (1995).
70. See generally Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 69 (finding that judgments of nursing
home inspectors are more consistent under the relatively informal Australian system than under the
U.S. one, in part because discussion among inspectors leads to convergence).
71. ROBERT MARDER & MARK A. SMITH, EFFECTIVE PEER REVIEW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
CONTEMPORARY DESIGN (2005) (on unexpected outcome reviews in medicine); Rees, supra note 23,
at 130–49 (on “significant operating event” reporting and analysis in nuclear power regulation).
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72

decisionmaker. Such hearings must be triggered by a complaint. Neither the
APA nor the canonical Goldberg v. Kelly line of due process cases requires
affirmative administrative efforts to identify errors.
Moreover, the separation of adjudication from line administration tends to
be assumed or mandated in canonical administrative law. Line administrators
do not treat hearing dispositions as precedents for their decisions. Just as an
agency has no enforceable duty to acquire and consider information generally,
it has no duty to follow up on systemically relevant information disclosed in
adjudications.
Peer review, far from being mandated, is in some tension with the norm of
independent decisionmaking. Administrative law judges (ALJs) tend to resist
efforts to induce consistent decisionmaking by means other than case-by-case
appeals of their decisions. They oppose mandated peer exchanges or broad
performance assessments as interference with the norm of independence. Social
73
Security ALJs have engaged for decades in “trench warfare” with top
administrators over efforts to induce more consistency in the ALJs’ decisions,
74
including a “[p]eer [r]eview” program. The courts have recognized a “right of
decisional independence” that gives the ALJs standing to challenge supervisory
75
efforts. Although no such efforts have been enjoined to date, the courts have
76
expressed reservations about them.
As a form of error detection, the canonical independent hearing has
manifest limitations. First, in many contexts, people do not have the material or
informational resources to identify and prosecute claims. Thus, many errors do
not surface in the hearing process, and even if they surface, they may go

72. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(c), 557(d)(1)-(2) (affording claimants the right to present arguments and
evidence, prohibiting decisionmaker from ex parte consultation and requiring that she not be under the
supervision or direction of agency personnel with “investigative or prosecutorial functions”); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (holding that due process requires, prior to termination of certain
welfare benefits, a hearing before an officer who has not participated in making the decision under
review). See also 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (providing that specified adverse personnel actions against
administrative law judges may be taken only for “good cause” as determined by the Merit Systems
Protection Board).
73. JERRY MASHAW, RICHARD MERRILL, & PETER SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 463 (6th ed. 2003).
74. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 12–13 (2d Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id.; Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989); see also, Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v.
Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 (D.D.C. 1984) (suggesting in dictum that another Social Security
Administration effort to review adjudicatory decisions showed insensitivity to the decisional
independence of ALJs). The initiatives challenged in these cases were more hierarchical and coercive
than the term “peer review” usually connotes, and the courts seemed at least partly concerned that the
agency was trying to decrease pro-claimant decisions in an unprincipled and intransparent fashion.
Nevertheless, many of the plaintiffs’ objections would have applied equally to less heavy-handed
interventions. The history is summarized in Mashaw, Merrill, & Shane, supra note 73, at 461–67. See
also PHILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT
AGENCY 212, 214–21 (describing the “development of a judicial ethos” among hearing examiners in a
state workers’ compensation program who resisted supervision and insisted that they should be “free to
decide cases in accordance with our conscience”).
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unremedied there. For example, studies of some public assistance programs
have suggested that only a small fraction of erroneous frontline decisions (as
measured by audit-type review) surface in the hearing process. Such studies led
Jerry Mashaw some decades ago to argue that effective review requires courts
to recognize a “management side of due process,” but the canonical doctrine
has been unresponsive. The focus on case-by-case fairness means also that
information discovered in the hearing process does not feed back to influence
77
line administration.
Second, some programs with large volumes of hearings have shown both
high rates of reversals of line decisions as well as high variance among ALJs in
adjudicatory decisional patterns. The most salient example is the Social Security
disability program. Administrative denials of benefits are both appealed at a
high rate (in many years, half or more) and reversed at a high rate—lately about
78
two-thirds. In one period, about a fifth of ALJs reversed denials of benefits at
rates of one-third or below, and about a fifth reversed at rates of two-thirds or
above. The high rates of both appeals and reversals of appealed decisions
suggest that reversals are not a function of idiosyncratic factors that might
generate errors even in a well-configured process of initial decision. They
suggest that there is something systemically wrong about the line process. The
variance among adjudicatory decisionmakers suggests that there is something
systemically wrong with the hearing system. The Social Security Administration
has sought to address these problems, but nothing in canonical administrative
79
law obliges or even encourages it do so.

77. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of the Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974); see also JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF
DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY 64–77 (1986) (arguing that the reactive “due
process model” is generally ineffective in protecting beneficiary rights in welfare programs).
78. Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2011, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 146, 148 (2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/
di_asr/2011/index.html.
79. As another example, consider the limitations of administrative complaint systems as a
response to police abuse.
[E]ven if a significant number of complaints were to be sustained, there is no persuasive
evidence that this would have a deterrent effect on other officers. [Moreover,] focusing on
individual complaints tends to make rank and file officers scapegoats for police misconduct
when such misconduct is the product of an organizational culture that permits it to exist.
Recognizing this latter point, a number of experts on oversight argue that oversight agencies
should focus on policies and procedures designed to change the underlying organizational
culture.
Samuel Walker, The New World of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department’s “Pattern and
Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 24 (2003). See also Margo Schlanger,
Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in Hospitals, A Large Retailer, and Jails and
Prisons), 2 J. OF TORT L. 44 (2008) (concluding that “it is rare in corrections that . . . information [from
judicial petitions and administrative grievances] is used to strategize harm reduction”).
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III
NONCANONICAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Most law that concerns public administration is outside the conventional
corpus of administrative law. And much of this outside law assumes or enacts a
different model of public administration from the one that dominates the
canon. Performance-based organization is prominent in the noncanonical
output of all three branches.
A. Statutes
Some noncanonical administrative law takes the form of general statutes
that are not codified in the APA mandating practices across agencies and
programs. A critical landmark is the Legislative Reorganization Act passed in
1946, the same year as the APA. The Act clarified committee jurisdictions,
expanded staff, and committed Congress to “continuous watchfulness” over the
80
executive branch. Since then, legislative oversight processes have grown
steadily into a vast set of preoccupying pressures on administrators. These
processes put strong emphasis on transparency, planning, and proactive error
detection.
Congress periodically forces administrators to produce information on
public programs in connection with reauthorization and appropriations hearings
and special investigations. It also mandates the routine provision of information
on program operations, requiring extensive annual reports from federal officers.
These requirements differ from the canonical requirements of FOIA in that
they mandate not just disclosure of whatever information has been prepared
independently, but affirmative efforts to generate and organize information.
While the aim of oversight is in part to ascertain officials’ compliance with
previously enacted statutes, it is also concerned with assessment of efficacy. A
notable expression of this concern is the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA). The statute has been described as the “centerpiece of a
statutory framework Congress put in place in the 1990s” to improve efficiency
81
and accountability.
The GPRA requires each federal agency to prepare a multiyear “strategic
plan.” The plan must set out a “comprehensive mission statement” as well as
short- and long-term goals, a description of the process by which the goals were
set, and an account of the factors on which attainment of the goals depends.
The agency must annually create a “performance plan,” indicating what
progress it expects to make in the coming year and setting forth specific
80. 60 Stat. 812 § 136 (1946). Joel Auerbach calls the statute the “first formal congressional
endorsement of oversight.” JOEL AUERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 22 (1990). See generally Jack Beerman, Congressional Administration,
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006); Walter J. Oleszek, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: AN OVERVIEW
(Congressional Research Service, 2011).
81. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 04-38, RESULTS-ORIENTED GOVERNMENT:
GPRA HAS ESTABLISHED A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR ACHIEVING BETTER RESULTS 25 ( 2004).
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“performance indicators” for measuring success. At the same time, it must
produce annually a “program performance” report on the past year’s
operations, describing efforts to evaluate its activities, measuring performance
82
against indicators, and describing actions needed to address unmet goals.
Amendments made in 2010 require the agencies to consult with relevant
congressional committees in developing and revising their plans, and the
amendments also require the Office of Management and Budget to consult with
83
congressional committees on overall “federal priorities.”
General oversight processes also address error detection. One important
oversight practice—“casework” in which congressional staff intervene on behalf
of complaining constituents—resembles the adjudicatory processes of canonical
administrative law by being reactive and complaint-driven (as well as opaque
and devoid of diagnostic value). But oversight also includes notable proactive
interventions. Congress engages in various forms of audit-type review through
the Government Accountability Office (GAO). It also has institutionalized a
general form of internal proactive error detection in the form of inspectors
general, who conduct investigations and audits in more than seventy agencies.
Under the Inspector General Act of 1978, they operate with substantial
independence of the agency’s line administration, and their reports go to
Congress as well as to the agency leadership (and to the Attorney General in
84
case of findings of malfeasance).
Performance-based themes also can be found in program-specific forms in
many (probably most) of the major regulatory and welfare initiatives enacted
since the 1960s. The newer orientation can be illustrated with three statutes: (1)
a social welfare statute, Title I of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998
85
(WIA); (2) a civil rights statute, the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
86
(PREA); and (3) a health-and-safety statute, the Food Safety Modernization
87
Act of 2011(FSMA). The prior-authorization approach to legitimacy does not
fit any of these statutes. They do not authorize specific conduct so much as
identify problems and mandate efforts to explore them. The statutes are almost
82. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et
seq.
83. GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, §§ 2(b), (d); 5(a)(3); 31 U.S.C. §§
306(b), (d); 1120(a)(3). Commenters suggest that the promise of the GPRA remains unfulfilled under
current practice, in which agencies tend to adopt vague and undemanding goals and metrics, but that
feasible reforms might make it a valuable process. Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture,
Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (2008); GAO, MANAGING FOR RESULTS:
DATA-DRIVEN PERFORMANCE REVIEWS SHOW PROMISE BUT AGENCIES SHOULD EXPLORE HOW
TO INVOLVE OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES (GAO 13-28, 2013). There is an interesting contrast
between the lack of interest of recent presidential administrations in GPRA compliance and their
intense preoccupation with upfront cost-benefit-analysis requirements.
84. See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights From Within?: Inspectors General and National Security
Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2012).
85. Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801 et seq.
86. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79; 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601 et seq.
87. Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-353 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.)
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entirely procedural. They aim to structure activities in ways that make them
coherent and transparent. To be sure, some procedures are mandated in detail,
and a court looking for “law to apply” might order an agency to comply with
these procedural provisions. But the provisions reflect a very different view of
administration than the canon, which treats as matters of presumptive
administrative discretion the practices that these statutes regulate most
intensely, in particular, planning, monitoring, and reassessment.
All three statutes endorse proactive planning. The WIA sets up a structure
through which the Department of Labor makes grants to and supervises state
Workforce Investment Boards, which in turn make grants to and supervise local
boards. The state and local boards must each develop plans that show how they
88
will address worker skill and knowledge deficits. The PREA-implementing
regulations prescribe that each federal and state agency that manages prisons
engage in “responsive planning” that will produce, among other things, an
investigative “protocol” for indications of sexual abuse and a “staffing plan”
89
that will minimize dangers of abuse. And the FSMA provides for FDA
licensing of food-processing facilities: the key licensing criterion is that the
facility has an adequate Hazard Analysis and Risk-Based Prevention Control
90
plan.
All three statutes also mandate monitoring. The WIA requires that the
Secretary of Labor “provide for the continuing evaluation” of the state
91
programs.
Both state and local plans must contain “performance
accountability system[s]” in which the federal agency (in the case of the state
plans) and the state board (in the case of the local ones) analyze data to
92
determine that specified benchmarks have been met. Among the “indicators of
performance” to be assessed are the entry rates of participants into
employment, job retention six months from graduation, earnings six months
from graduation, and the receipt of licenses and certifications that enhance
employability. States and localities are expected to develop additional
93
indicators.
The PREA creates a Review Panel on Prison Rape to collect data and
94
produce an annual report. The panel must rank facilities by incidence of rape
95
after adjusting for such factors as population size and prisoner characteristics.
The Act also requires a plan for internal staff monitoring, including video
monitoring. Every prison must be audited at least every three years by an
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2822, 2833 (2012).
89. 28 C.F.R. 115 321–22.
90. 21 U.S.C. § 350(g).
91. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 112; 29 U.S.C. § 2822.
92. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 118; 29 U.S.C. § 2833.
93. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 136; 29 U.S.C. § 2871. WIA also has provisions
characteristic of federal grant programs requiring financial audits of state programs and private service
providers. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 §§ 159(b)(2), 184(a)(5); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2899(b)(2), 2934(a).
94. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 4(b); 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b) (2012).
95. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 4(b)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b)(2)(A).
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96

independent “correctional monitoring body.”
The FSMA prescribes that the FDA inspect licensed facilities and prioritize
inspections on the basis of risk. At the facility level, it mandates that the
“owner, operators, or manager shall monitor the effectiveness of [plan]
97
98
controls.” The FDA is charged with developing “performance standards.”
All three statutes also require that plans must be regularly reassessed and
revised. When WIA benchmarks are not met, service providers must develop
99
“performance improvement plans.” Repeated failure to achieve targets
100
requires changes in state or local plans. Under the PREA, facilities must, in
connection with each investigation of indications of rape, consider whether the
findings indicate a need for policy change. The FSMA requires that facilities
that fail to achieve “zero tolerance” must periodically produce “corrective
101
action” plans. All facilities must engage in “periodic reanalysis” of their plans
to ensure that they are “still relevant to the raw materials, conditions, and
102
processes in the facility, and new and emerging threats.” With respect to
imported food, the statute prescribes that U.S. authorities establish a “foreign
supplier verification program” by which exporters can get expedited processing
if they have demonstrated the efficacy of their safety measures. A key
consideration in this assessment is the adequacy of the foreign country’s food103
safety system. At the same time, the statute sets up processes for exchanging
information and technical assistance between the United States and foreign
104
regulators. Since some foreign nations will be seeking reassurance about U.S.
efforts, the arrangements seem to contemplate a kind of peer review among
regulators from different nations.
105
Although the three regimes make use of complaint-initiated hearings, they
also emphasize proactive forms of error detection. The monitoring provisions
just mentioned are proactive. In addition, the FSMA and PREA emphasize the
diagnostic use of specific error analysis. PREA requires that the Review Panel
on Prison Rape conduct annual hearings focused on the three best performing

96. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 4; 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b); 28 C.F.R. 115.401–04.
97. Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 103(d); 30fg(d); 21 U.S.C. 2201.
98. Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 104; 21 U.S.C. § 2201.
99. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 112(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 2871(b)(6).
100. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 §§ 136(a)-(e); 172a; 29 U.S.C. §2871(a)-(e).
101. 28 C.F.R. 115.86, 115.93.
102. Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011§ 103(f)(5); 21 U.S.C. § 350g(f)(5).
103. Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011§ 301(c)(2), 303(b); 21 USC 384a(c)(2), 303b.
104. Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011§ 103(d),(e), (i); 21 U.S.C. § 350g(d), (e), (i).
105. Workforce Investment Act of 1998 §§ 122(g), 181(c), 184(a), 186; 29 U.S.C. §§ 2842(g),
2931(c), 2934 (providing for hearings for grantees faced with financial penalties and for disappointed
applicants for some forms of assistance); Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 104 (providing for
hearings for facilities faced with termination of registration). The PREA does not explicitly require
hearings (as opposed to investigations) on inmate complaints, but all state provide grievance
procedures that, in principle, adjudicate complaints of mistreatment. Margo Schlanger, Prison and Jail
Grievance Policies, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Pages/
PrisonGrievanceProceduresandSamples.aspx.
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and three worst performing facilities in the year’s audit sample. The hearings
will naturally tend to focus on the causes and remedies for low-performing
institutions. FSMA requires that the FDA develop “surveillance systems” for
107
foodborne illness that can respond quickly to evidence of contamination. The
systems must have the capacity to “trace back” particular contaminated
108
products through the supply chain to the source of the problem. As we have
seen, problems discovered in inspections typically lead to a “corrective action
109
plan.”
It is ambiguous how strongly proactive these measures are. They clearly
require the systemic generalization and diagnostic use of monitoring data.
However, it is often less clear how much the monitoring will involve the close
analysis of specific incidents that defines strong proactive error detection. The
one provision in these regimes that clearly requires strong proactive behavior is
the requirement in the PREA regulations for sexual-abuse-incident reviews.
When one of these required investigations either finds sexual abuse has
occurred or proves inconclusive, a team that includes senior managers must
determine “whether the allegation or investigation indicates a need to change
110
policy or practice to better prevent, detect, or respond to sexual abuse.” The
team is specifically directed to consider what the incident reveals about the
adequacy of building configuration, monitoring technology, and staffing.
There is no consensus on the efficacy of these three regimes. Appraisals of
111
WIA are “mixed,” and PREA and the FSMA have only recently been
implemented. However, with a few exceptions, criticisms of the program do not
take issue with their rejection of the “compliance orientation” but rather
suggest that the proactive, diagnostic approach has been insufficiently
112
implemented.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 4(b); 42 U.S.C. § 15603(b); 28 C.F.R. 115.401- 405.
Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011§ 205(b); 21 U.S.C.§ 2224(b).
Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 110(f); 21 U.S.C. § 2204(f).
Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 § 102(b)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 374(b).
Id. 28 C.F.R. 115.186.
THE WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT: IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES AND EVALUATION
FINDINGS 44 (Douglas Besharov & Phoebe H. Cottingham eds., 2011). See also Workforce Investment
Act: Strategies Needed to Improve Certain Training Outcome Data, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-137.
112. For qualifiedly optimistic appraisal of PREA, see David Kaiser & Lovisa Stannow, Prison
Rape: Obama’s Program to Stop It, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/prison-rape-obamas-stop-it; David Kaiser &
Lovisa Stannow, Prison Rape and the Government, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 24, 2011,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/mar/24/prison-rape-and-government. FSMA
is still in the course of initial implementation, but a qualifiedly optimistic assessment of the Department
of Agriculture’s Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point program for meat and poultry—in some
respects a prototype for the FSMA regime—can be found in Committee on the Review of the Use of
Scientific Criteria and Performance Standards for Safe Food, National Research Council, SCIENTIFIC
CRITERIA TO ENSURE SAFE FOOD 133–75 (2003).
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B. Executive Branch Initiatives
Even without congressional prompting, executive-branch officials often act
113
to impose discipline on administrative processes. Such initiatives have
increasingly reflected performance-based principles. Some of them regulate
administrative processes generally. We have noted that the most famous of
these—Executive Order 12,866 requiring cost-benefit analysis—retains a
bureaucratic flavor in its preoccupation with promulgation of regulations.
However, one provision in this order has a distinctly performance-oriented
tone: it mandates that regulations “to the extent feasible, specify performance
objectives, rather than the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated
114
entities must adopt.” President Obama’s directive on “open government and
115
transparency” is also in the spirit of performance-based administration.
Performance-based principles are also salient in program-specific initiatives.
Three examples are (1) the technical guide on “[a]daptive [m]anagement” of
116
the Department of the Interior, (2) the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) of
117
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and (3) the Voluntary Protection
Program (VPP) of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
118
(OSHA).
The adaptive management guide sets out recommendations for planning
and implementation in situations within the Department’s responsibilities
characterized by “uncertainty.” Such situations arise in the management of
public forests and parks, the design and operation of irrigation and dam
projects, habitat conservation under the Endangered Species Act, and the
preparation of environmental impact statements under the National
Environmental Policy Act. ROP and VPP concern inspection and enforcement
practice. They set out processes through which firms can reduce some burdens
of regulatory oversight by demonstrating the reliability of their safety practices.
All three initiatives have only weak backward-looking legitimacy. They are
113. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Magill, supra
note 32; JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 285–316 (2012); Zaring, supra note 1.
114. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. §601 app. at 86–
91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)
115. Memorandum on the President’s Open Government Directive, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET (Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/documents/open-governmentdirective. For some of the fruits of this effort, see http://www.performance.gov (last visited Feb. 3,
2015).
116. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT (rev. ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOI
Guide].
117. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1029, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION: OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY HAS IMPROVED, BUT REFINEMENTS
ARE NEEDED [hereinafter GAO NRC Report]; Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Revision of NRC
Enforcement Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 25368 (May 1, 2000) [hereinafter NRC Revision].
118. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-395, OSHA’S VOLUNTARY PROTECTION
PROGRAMS: IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND CONTROLS WOULD BETTER ENSURE PROGRAM QUALITY
[hereinafter GAO OSHA Report]; OSHA, VOLUNTARY PROTECTION PLAN POLICIES AND
PROCEDURE MANUAL (April 18, 2008) [hereinafter VPP Manual].
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not derived from specific statutory provisions. The Department of the Interior’s
adaptive planning guide addresses circumstances where planning is mandated
by statutes, but the guide’s directions about how to plan are not derived from
any statute. The NRC and OSHA initiatives have some resemblance to the
monitored self-regulatory approach of the Food Safety Modernization Act, but
unlike the food safety statute, the nuclear and workplace safety statutes do not
mention such self-regulatory activities. The NRC and OSHA provisions cite as
authority only vague substantive provisions, such as OSHA’s mandate “to
assure . . . safe and healthy working conditions,” and provisions giving the
agency discretion to seek penalties, including OSHA’s authority to shut down
119
plants it deems unsafe. A GAO report on the NRC regime notes that it
operates largely independently of “regulatory requirements”—that is, statutory
120
and administrative rules. In determining what demands to make on a facility,
the agency takes account of conditions it deems dangerous even if they do not
violate a rule. Conversely, a rule violation that does not affect safety is not
counted for this purpose. In principle, only rule violations are subject to
“enforcement actions” for civil and criminal penalties. On the other hand, any
safety concern can affect “oversight.” Since “oversight” determines not only the
amount of inspection and remediation, but whether the plant is permitted to
121
operate, it is at least as potent as “enforcement.”
Although they prove weak on backward-looking accountability, the three
initiatives strive for forward-looking accountability through guidance designed
to make agency activity more intelligible, disclosure requirements, and periodic
122
engagement with stakeholders.
The three regimes start with planning. With adaptive management, the
agency invites a broad range of stakeholders to develop the plan. With the
safety initiatives, the regulated firms develop their plans, and the agency
reviews and certifies them. Monitoring is also a central theme. Adaptive
123
management plans must specify “critical monitoring variables.” In the OSHA
and NRC regimes, the regulators prescribe key indicators. Eligibility for
reduced inspection under the VPP depends centrally on a firm’s total case
incidence rate and its “[d]ays, [a]way, [r]estricted and/or [t]ransfer [r]ate”
(measures of accidents and their effects on work processes) relative to industry
124
norms. NRC tracks fifteen performance indicators. On the basis of these
indicators, it ranks plants in four categories of risk. Higher risk classifications
119. All About VPP, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/all_about_vpp.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).
NRC Revision at 11–12.
120. GAO NRC Report at 19.
121. Id. at 21.
122. DOI Guide at 23; GAO NRC Report, at 20–21, 28–29; GAO OSHA Report at 11. The
transparency and participation themes are weaker in the OSHA initiative than the other two but still
discernible.
123. DOI Guide at 12–15.
124. GAO OSHA Report at 3.
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are inspected more frequently and intensely and demand more remedial efforts
from operators. A key part of agency monitoring in the ROP and VPP is
focused on facility self-monitoring. The agencies look to see not just whether
there have been problems, but whether the regulated actors have themselves
125
detected the problems. Problems should lead to reassessment of the plan, so
the agencies also evaluate the facilities on their capacity to revise their plans in
126
response to evidence of inadequacy.
Error detection in these regimes is proactive. Complaints do not play a
prominent role in any of them. Aside from proactive monitoring, they
sometimes take an ambitiously diagnostic approach to indications of problems.
The adaptive management guide prescribes that the plan be based on a
scientific model that includes predictions as to how the environment will
respond to relevant interventions. The plan’s “critical monitoring variables”
127
should be designed to test these predictions. The safety regimes prescribe
both routine attention to designated indicators and “root cause analysis” of
128
accidents or unexpected adverse events.
Assessments of the three regimes suggest that their efficacy varies. The
GAO has evaluated the NRC’s ROP as generally successful. It has evaluated
OSHA’s VPP as seriously flawed, and critics have charged that some of the
plans under the Department of the Interior’s adaptive planning approach have
129
been unsatisfactory. Among GAO’s criticisms of OSHA are that it fails to
reassess VPP eligibility regularly or even after accidents at certified firms and
that it has failed to develop effective indices of the program’s effectiveness. A
prominent criticism of adaptive management is that the adaptation idea is often
used as an excuse for deferring even contingent resolution of key foreseeable
issues. For example, water conservation plans may recite as goals the
satisfaction of both environmental needs and agricultural demand, but these
plans may also fail to specify what happens if and when either goal is not
satisfied.
Two points should be noted about such failings. First, they do not impugn
the move to performance-based organization but simply the failure to execute it
properly. Second, these failings suggest a potential role for administrative law.
Canonical administrative law is largely indifferent to planning, monitoring,
reassessment, and proactive error detection. The residual State Farm duty of
reasonable consideration and explanation is consistently applied only in
connection with rulemaking. However, were the canon to try to take account of
performance-based organization, a logical step might be to extend judicial

125. GAO NRC Report at 11 (“NRC bases its oversight process on the principle and requirement
that licensees have programs in place to routinely identify and address performance issues without
NRC’s direct involvement.”); DOI Guide at 33–34; VPP Manual at 21–36.
126. GAO NRC Report at 3–4, 14; VPP Manual at 34; DOI Guide at 35–38.
127. DOI Guide at 12.
128. GAO NRC Report at 14; GAO OSHA Report at 16.
129. GAO NRC Report at 14; Fischman & Ruhl, supra note 59, at 441.
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intervention to failures of the kind the critics assert. The next subsection
highlights how extreme instances of such failures sometimes lead to radical
judicial intervention in the form of structural injunctions. However, there are
often no judicial remedies for less extreme failures. A possible response would
be to extend State Farm to hold that reasonable consideration and explanation
often requires minimally adequate planning, monitoring, reassessment, and
proactive error detection.
C. Judicial Initiatives
“[R]espondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by
court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of
130
Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made,” Justice
Scalia wrote for the Court, denying relief in Lujan. In fact, there is an important
category of cases in which courts entertain claims for wholesale improvement of
public programs. In “public law” or “institutional-reform” litigation, the courts
adjudicate claims of systemic official misconduct calling for relief involving
administrative restructuring. Judicial decrees have reformed practices and
processes of school systems, police departments, prisons, mental health
institutions, child welfare systems, and other public agencies. Although this type
of judicial practice remains controversial, it has proved durable and remains an
important influence on many areas of government activity. In the Supreme
Court’s latest encounter with public law litigation, it affirmed, 5–4, a decree
radically altering California’s prison system, and only two of the dissenters—
Justices Scalia and Thomas—raised objections that challenged the general
131
legitimacy of structural decrees.
These judicial interventions are intensely administrative. Sometimes they
resolve substantive disagreements. But just as often, plaintiffs complain that the
defendants are failing to respect substantive norms that all parties concede are
binding. The judicial interventions tend to assume common patterns that are
substantially independent of the particular substantive laws at stake and of
132
whether the claims are statutory or constitutional. In effect, they constitute an
implicit common law of administration that is triggered by a showing of
systemic failures of performance and accountability with respect to important
133
rights or benefits. In its most promising current configuration, this common
law has little resemblance to canonical administrative law. Rulemaking and

130. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
131. Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1921 (2011).
132. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976); Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L. REV.
626 (1981); Darryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857
(1999).
133. Where the substantive claims are constitutional, the remedial jurisprudence could plausibly
considered “constitutional common law”—terms derived from the constitution but not specifically
mandated by it and subject to revision and experimentation. See Henry Monaghan, Constitutional
Common Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889 (1976).
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individual hearings play only peripheral roles in it. Norms are revised too
frequently for notice-and-comment rulemaking, and the approach to error
134
detection is more proactive and diagnostic than that of adjudicatory hearings.
Backward-looking legitimacy is hard to achieve in institutional-reform cases
because the violation typically does not imply a unique remedy. Thus, critics
charge that judges arbitrarily impose a particular administrative regime that
135
usurps the authority of executive officials. This might be a plausible criticism
136
of some decrees in the once-favored command-and-control style, but it is a
mischaracterization of many decrees, and perhaps most recent ones. In the most
promising recent cases, once liability is conceded or found by the court, the
remedial regime is negotiated by the parties. The negotiated character of the
relief does not make it consensual in any strong sense (even though the remedy
is often called a “consent decree”). The court intervenes coercively. It forces the
agency to engage with the plaintiffs both directly and indirectly—directly by
ordering the agency to negotiate and indirectly by changing the balance of
power.
The balance of power is changed through a “penalty default”—the threat
that the court will impose a harsher sanction than either party typically wants in
the event that the parties fail to agree. The default sanction might be the closure
of a facility, large fines, monetary sanctions against individual defendants, or
137
the appointment of a receiver. It is a penalty default because, in most cases, it
134. See Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Foreword: Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1062 (2004).
135. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 1953 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that structural decrees turn
“judges into long-term administrators of complex social institutions”); accord ROSS SANDLER &
DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN
GOVERNMENT (2003).
Whether systemic relief should be regarded as more intrusive than the individual relief the critics would
prefer depends on, in addition to the character of the systemic relief, whether individual relief would
actually be available to all affected individuals. Without systemic relief, individuals with valid claims
might lack the material, informational, or psychological resources to pursue their claims effectively, but
the resulting administrative autonomy could not plausibly be viewed as a normative baseline. On the
other hand, if we assume aggrieved class members could obtain individual relief, there is no reason to
think that a series of individual orders would be less burdensome to defendants. Indeed the prospect of
multiple orders would probably induce defendants to seek consolidated proceedings that might
resemble the ones to which the critics object on their behalf.
136. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (reversing a prison-reform decree that, among
other things, specified what books had to be in the prison library).
137. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance,
in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 293–321 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006).

The prison population cap upheld in Plata combines features of a conventional
remedy and a penalty default. It is conventional to the extent that it contributes more
directly to the vindication of the relevant substantive rights to medical care than, say, a
fine or official incarceration. On the other hand, it is a penalty default to the extent
that its designers would have preferred that it induce negotiation of a more effective
alternative rather than be specifically enforced. To the extent that it is a penalty
default, Plata shows that specifically enforcing such penalties may sometimes be
necessary when defendants persistently fail to perform. Even here, however, it is
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does not represent the court’s estimate of the most appropriate intervention,
but the court’s estimate of what will induce the parties to negotiate a better one.
The court needs the parties to negotiate because they have better
understanding of how to effectively change the institution and because some
level of cooperation by the defendant will be needed to implement the
intervention. Thus, legitimacy is substantially forward-looking. It depends on
the capacity of the remedy to improve agency performance and increase
138
accountability to the plaintiff class and the general public.
Three cases illustrate the tenor of second-generation public law
remediation. The first is the San Joaquin River Restoration Program, created
by a consent decree in a case brought by environmental groups against state and
federal officials involved in diverting and controlling water in the San Joaquin
River. A central claim was that the defendants had harmed fish protected by
139
the Endangered Species Act through excessive diversion for agricultural uses.
The second case is a challenge by racial minority group members and the
American Civil Liberties Union to “stop-and-frisk” policing practices in the city
140
of Philadelphia. The case asserted unconstitutional racial profiling. And the
final case is a suit on behalf of children by the National Youth Law Center
against the Utah agency responsible for protecting abused and neglected
141
children. The critical claim was that the state systematically neglected its
responsibility to provide reasonable care to children in its custody.
The police and child welfare settlements incorporate measures widely
regarded as “best practices” and employed in other jurisdictions voluntarily or
142
by virtue of other judicial orders. The San Joaquin River decree is unusual in
some respects, but its broad outlines resonate with the adaptive management
misleading to characterize the court’s intervention as taking over management of the
agency. As the majority pointed out, the order settles only one parameter, and the
agency retains wide discretion how to comply with it.
Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1941 (2011).
138. The court has occasionally insisted on the backward-looking perspective, demanding that the
remedy be derived more or less rigorously from the violation. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
746 (1974) (remedy must be limited to undoing the “incremental segregative effect” of proven
discrimination). But later cases ignore this demand, perhaps because it is hard to translate into practice
and potentially more disruptive than other approaches. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 134, at 1082–90.
139. Notice of Lodgment of Stipulation of Settlement, Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, Case No.
S-88-1658-LKK/GGH, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2006) [hereinafter San Joaquin Notice]. Information on the
program and its implementation can be found at www.restoresjr.net. The settlement was conditioned
on federal and state funding that required legislative approval, which was in fact forthcoming. San
Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 1001-10203; California Propositions
13, 84 (2006).
140. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of
Philadelphia, C.A. 10-5952. (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) [hereinafter Philadelphia Agreement].
141. David C. v. Leavitt, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Utah 1998); Utah Department of Child and
Family Services, The Milestone Plan (May 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Utah Milestone
Plan]..
142. Walker, supra note 79; Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sabel, & William H. Simon, Legal
Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 523 (2009).

SIMON_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE)

Nos. 1 & 2 2015]

3/3/2015 12:56 AM

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PREMISES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

95

procedures recommended in the Department of the Interior guide and
143
commonly found in environmental restoration regimes. The Utah child
protective services case is the oldest. It was concluded in 2007, fifteen years
after it was filed, when the parties stipulated that the remedial reforms had been
successfully implemented. The other two regimes are still under construction.
Of the three decrees, only the River Restoration case purports to settle
important substantive issues and contains extensive direction of primary
conduct. There, the decree obligates the defendants to construct extensive
physical improvements, such as bypass channels and fish ladders. It also sets out
detailed standards for the operation of a large dam and other facilities to ensure
minimum flows of water for fish and other species. Nevertheless, the decree
contemplates that many issues will be worked out in the course of
implementation.
The Philadelphia and Utah decrees contain virtually no substantive
provisions other than recitations of general uncontested propositions (for
instance, that police stops require “reasonable suspicion” or that the Utah
agency is obliged “to provide for the protection, permanence and well-being of
144
children and families in Utah”). The San Joaquin decree, in part, and virtually
the entirety of the other two are concerned with establishing processes that will
provide for coherent and transparent implementation and continuously
elaborating standards to address new issues in ways that give assurance to the
plaintiffs that their views and interests will be considered. The decrees are thus
145
centrally concerned with plans, monitoring, and reassessment.
The San Joaquin decree contains an overall plan for the restoration of the
river. It also contemplates the development by the parties of future plans for
146
such tasks as the reintroduction of salmon and the recirculation of water. The
Philadelphia decree requires the defendant to review all of its “training,
supervision, and discipline policies” and to make appropriate changes after
147
consultation with the plaintiffs. The Utah decree incorporates an extensive
“Milestone Plan” the parties developed that regulates client services
143. E.g., Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 255 F. 3d 342 (7th Cir.
2001); Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 59.
144. Philadelphia Agreement, supra note 140, at Part II (D); Utah Milestone Plan, supra note 141,
at 5.
145. The San Joaquin decree has a connection to canonical doctrine, since it was styled as a
challenge under APA sections 702-06 to action “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” Where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a federal statute that does
not provide a specific private right of action, plaintiffs typically appeal to the APA as support for
reviewability. But very little in doctrine elaborating the APA explains or supports the complex,
performance-based remedy in the case. By contrast, the remedy has much in common with remedies in
institutional-reform cases brought under noncanonical authority, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 1983
(authorizing suits against state officers acting under color of law for violations of federal rights) or
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (finding an implied right of action
against federal officials for violations of the bill of rights). The Philadelphia police case and the Utah
child protective services cases were brought under section 1983.
146. San Joaquin Notice ¶¶14, 16, 17-19, Exhibit D.
147. Philadelphia Agreement 2(D).
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comprehensively. The plan sets out a distinctive vision of social service
administration. The center of the vision is an individualized case plan for each
child constructed by an interdisciplinary professional team with family members
148
and caretakers.
All three decrees provide for monitors (called in the San Joaquin case
“Restoration Administrator”) chosen by the parties jointly. The monitor’s role
is to assemble and report information and to make recommendations to the
defendants. There is an implicit (or in the San Joaquin case, explicit) duty on
the part of the defendants to explain departures from the monitor’s
recommendations.
The San Joaquin decree specifies the six points on the river where flows will
be measured, and more generally requires the development of guidelines for
149
the measurement and reporting of releases. The Philadelphia decree requires
the city to review its reporting protocols for stops, in consultation with the
plaintiffs, so that data needed to assess racial bias is included. The city is
required to record the reports electronically in a searchable form and then to
produce monthly reports for the plaintiffs. Philadelphia must also institute
periodic audits by supervisors of a sample of specific incidents, periodic
“department wide audits and assessments” of the policies, and “triggering
150
thresholds for retraining, enhanced supervision, or discipline of officers.”
About half of the ninety-one single-spaced pages of the Utah plan are devoted
to monitoring. It specifies a range of indicators to be measured and reported
and a series of “accountability structures” involving monitoring by both insiders
and outsiders. At the casework level, among the key skills taught to workers
151
and assessed in evaluations is “tracking” the circumstances of the child.
Each of the decrees contemplates reassessment of norms and practices as
part of the normal operation of the decree. The San Joaquin agreement is the
only one that seeks to immunize some provisions—those that limit the amount
of reductions to be imposed on farmers—from reassessment for an extended
period (until 2025). But it contemplates that the monitor and the advisory
committee will make recommendations on a host of other issues in response to
152
monitoring data. Philadelphia and the plaintiffs agreed that each would
“review [monitoring] data and documentation under agreed upon benchmarks
for measuring compliance” with applicable standards and submit reports and
153
recommendations every six months to the monitor and the court.
The Utah plan is the most insistent about the centrality of reassessment. All
of its many monitoring processes are described as mechanisms to support
transparency and reassessment. The key focus, it insists, is on the “self148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Utah Milestone Plan at 5–21.
San Joaquin Notice 13(g),(j).
Philadelphia Agreement II(C), (G); IV(c).
Utah Milestone Plan at 60–91; Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra note 142, at 536–40.
San Joaquin Agreement ¶¶ 14, 16, 20.
Philadelphia Agreement IV(D).
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correcting, continuous quality improvement.” It continues, “The plan and the
approach to monitoring make the performance feedback process more organic
and developmental than deficiency finding [i.e., compliance assessment] alone.”
To coordinate re-assessment, the plan establishes regional Quality
Improvement Committees “to study the data and outcomes children, families,
and communities experience, and to suggest changes in resource deployment,
154
policy, procedure, and practice.”
Institutional-reform remedies make use of the kind of proactive error
detection that treats individual cases diagnostically. Viewed as a whole, the
institutional-reform suit itself often exemplifies such error detection. When
liability is contested, a central part of the plaintiffs’ evidence usually explores a
series of individual instances of violations. The plaintiffs argue that the court
can infer from statistical evidence or evidence of general structure and practice
that the individual cases are exemplary of more general phenomena and can
make inferences from the cases about specific causes and effects of the systemic
155
problems.
These three examples differ in the extent that they are ambitiously proactive
within the remedial structures. The San Joaquin decree does not mention error
detection, although some forms of it might be appropriate, such as the
diagnostic incident or “significant operating event” reviews performed in
156
medicine and “high reliability” systems like aviation. The Philadelphia police
decree requires review of records of specific stops but it is unclear whether it
contemplates aggregate “checklist”-type compliance analysis, on the one hand,
or the close diagnostic analysis associated with the ambitious form of error
detection on the other. Of course, the Philadelphia decree is part of a larger
structure that includes both an administrative complaint process and lawsuits
for damages. These processes could be used diagnostically, and in some
157
regimes, they are.
The Utah child protective services decree is notable in its attempt to
combine rich exploration of individual incidents with systemic reassessment.
The centerpiece of the regime is a Quality Case Review (QCR). The process
begins with pulling a stratified random sample of cases. The cases are then
intensively reviewed through both examinations of documents and interviews
with the professionals, caregivers, and beneficiaries. The reviewers work in two154. Id.
155. E.g., Floyd v. City of New York, Opinion and Order, 08 Civ. 1034 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 12, 2013)
(combining detailed analysis of individual complaints with assessment of testimony on “institutional
practices” and statistics to conclude that the city’s “stop-and-frisk” practices are unconstitutional).
156. See sources cited supra notes 23–24.
157. For example, in a few cities, an independent board or agency “reviews complaints [against
police officers] for the purpose of both identifying problems with the complaint review process and also
of identifying the underlying causes of complaints and recommending the appropriate corrective
action.” Walker, supra note 79, at 25. Some cities integrate analysis of lawsuits into their “early warning
systems” designed to identify officers who should be disciplined or subjected to greater supervision
(though a larger number do not). See generally Joanna Schwartz, What the Police Learn from Lawsuits,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (2012).
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person teams, typically one from the state program office and the other an
outsider from an NGO, university, or another state program. They spend two
full days on each case. They score the case in terms of sets of metrics designed
to assess both fidelity to established policy and the efficacy of the intervention.
The criteria are qualitative. The system strives for consistency by demanding
consensus within the team and by having teams meet with each other to discuss
difficult judgments. Once the scores are set, each team meets with the case
workers and their supervisors to discuss possible improvements in the handling
of the case. Then review teams meet in larger groups with workers and
administrators to discuss possible systemic reforms indicated by the reviews.
The case scores are aggregated for the division as a whole and used as measures
of overall performance. The idea of combing rich exploration of particular
circumstance with diagnostic appraisal is expressed by one of the process’
158
designers in the motto, “Every case is a unique and valid test of the system.”
In 2007, the plaintiffs and agency agreed that the Utah system was
performing at a level that warranted termination of judicial supervision. In
agreeing to termination, the plaintiffs relied on aggregate QCR scores and on
the agency’s commitment to continue the process. In the same year, an
Alabama federal court decided to terminate judicial supervision of the
Alabama child protective services regime, relying centrally on the same
qualitative review process (designed in part by some of the same consultants
involved in the Utah decree). In this case, the plaintiffs opposed termination,
and there were disputes about the interpretation of its results. The court
adopted the agency’s interpretation, but in doing so, it treated the QCR process
as both a central indication of the agency’s level of performance and a basic
159
safeguard of “substantial compliance.”
The claims in the Alabama case were both constitutional and statutory.
Moreover, there were specific statutory procedures applicable to the program.
The court, however, made little effort to distinguish constitutional from
statutory requirements, and it largely ignored the statutory procedural
provisions, instead focusing on the QCR, which had no statutory mandate.
Thus, the court’s ruling might be understood as part of a common law of
responsible administration that entails duties to plan, monitor, and reassess. To
be sure, the court did not use these terms, probably because appellate doctrine
under section 1983 often purports to predicate liability on the state of mind of
senior managers. Cases tend to speak of mismanagement not as a breach of
160
duty in itself, but as evidence of illicit managerial intent. This intent seems
largely a fiction that functions only to link practice to a conception of public
duty that predates the administrative state. In this conception, government is
constituted by individual officers rather than institutions. Explicitly recognizing
duties to administer responsibly would fit better with much current practice and
158. Noonan, Sabel & Simon, supra note 142, at 542–49.
159. Id. at 1134–39, 1177–80.
160. E.g., Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2011).

SIMON_BOOKPROOF-CROSS-REFERENCED (DO NOT DELETE)

Nos. 1 & 2 2015]

3/3/2015 12:56 AM

THE ORGANIZATIONAL PREMISES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

99

161

might provide a more compelling justification for it.
IV
CONCLUSION

The preoccupation of the canon with judicial control of administrative
action now seems anachronistic and parochial. As scholarship and teaching
increasingly acknowledge, many of the most important legal determinants of
administrative action arise from (1) legislative action via statutes other than the
APA, (2) executive initiatives only tenuously connected to rulemaking and
adjudication, and (3) judicial practice in institutional-reform cases. These
initiatives tend to have a structure quite different from that of the canonical
doctrine. The differences in structure reflect differences in organizational
premises. The canonical doctrine tends to presuppose bureaucratic
organization. The noncanonical doctrine often arises from performance-based
organization. Updating the canon thus requires broadening its focus.
It also requires reconsideration of the canonical approach to the issue with
which the canon has been most concerned—judicial review of discrete
162
administrative action. As Edward Rubin says, the APA needs redrafting. But
significant reorientation could occur without new legislation. Most of the
canonical doctrine reviewed here arises from judicial interpretation of the
Constitution and the general clauses of the APA (notably the “arbitrary,
163
capricious” standard ) and a half-acknowledged exercise of common law
powers. The argument above supports suggestions for reorientation along three
broad lines.
First, judicial doctrine should be more attentive to oversight
164
accountability. It is not controversial that courts should enforce legislative
decisions where there are legislative decisions to enforce. However,
contemporary legislation increasingly addresses situations where neither the
dimensions of the problems nor their solutions can be known in advance of
intervention. Legislation thus becomes procedural and involves fewer decisions
of the kind that generate substantive “law to apply.” Courts should not try to
squeeze determinate guidance out of texts that do not reflect any determinate
understanding. At the same time, they should be more willing in situations of
statutory ambiguity to intervene to require measures that reinforce political
accountability. Chevron suggests the right sequence—consider whether the
statute gives the agency discretion, and then, whether the agency has acted
161. See Gillian Metzger, The Constitutional Status of Administration and the Duty to Supervise 124
YALE L. J. (forthcoming).
162. Rubin, supra note 26, at 189. See also Robin Kundis Craig and J.B. Ruhl, Designing
Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014) (proposing statutory changes
to accommodate adaptive management).
163. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
164. See Sidney Shapiro, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking inside the Agency for
Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 465 (2012) (arguing for more attention to “inside-out”
legitimacy rather than “outside-in” legitimacy).
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reasonably. But the latter step should be less interpretive and more procedural.
It bears on reasonableness whether the agency has acted coherently,
165
reflectively, and transparently.
Second, doctrine should be less intensely focused on rulemaking and less
deferential to non-rule-governed activity (in APA-speak, to informal
adjudication). The burden of rule-focused review should be lessened, perhaps
by eliminating pre-enforcement review or by more deference to procedurally
166
adequate decisions. At the same time, the courts should not leave non-rulegoverned administration immune from “arbitrary-and-capricious” review.
Recent judicial practice in structural reform cases shows that courts can
intervene to enforce accountability without dictating the substantive terms of
administrative practice. It also shows that courts can explicitly take into account
the level of administrative dysfunction in deciding when intervention is
appropriate. Canonical doctrine purports to rely on categorical indicators as to
when intervention is appropriate. Structural reform doctrine, more plausibly,
often insists on a showing of major dysfunction.
Third, appropriate error-detection efforts should not be framed exclusively
in terms of duties of individual fairness to complainants. Responsible
administration requires proactive efforts to identify and remedy errors, and it
often also requires a diagnostic approach to error that seeks the systemic
167
implications of particular problems.

165. Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Lisa Bressman, Judicial
Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1690–92 (2004).
166. See Mashaw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 30, at 106–81 (opposing preenforcement review); Peter Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over
Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992) (arguing for more
deference).
167. See Mashaw, Management Side of Due Process, supra note 77; Cuellar, supra note 38.

